Colin J. Bennett

Storming the Barricades so We Can All Be Private Together: Everyday Surveillance and the Politics of Privacy Advocacy

Privacy will be to the information economy of the next century, what consumer protection and environmental concerns have been to the industrial society of the 20th century.
Marc Rotenberg[1]

Get a couple beers in them and [privacy advocates] will fantasize about what they call the „Privacy Chernobyl" – the one privacy outrage that will finally catalyze an effective social movement around the issue.
Phil Agre[2]

If you want to say „hey chaps let's go and storm the barricades for privacy so we can all be private together" – that doesn't make sense as a political proposition.
Caspar Bowden[3]

1   Introduction[4]

There is common agreement from scholars of many disciplines that increasingly sophisticated forms of surveillance have become a condition of participation within modern life (Lyon 2001, 2007; Haggerty and Ericson, 2000, 2006). Surveillance is manifested in multiple technological and institutional forms, and operates in increasingly complex ways between organizations and individuals, organizations and organizations and individuals and individuals. There is also plenty of evidence that surveillance is resisted, both through official and institutional mechanisms, as well as through the multiple everyday strategies of ordinary people (Gilliom 2001; Marx 2003). Many have assumed, however, that surveillance has never been susceptible to challenge through collective action. Thus, David Lyon (2001, 135) concludes that „it sounds as if the politics of surveillance is wishful thinking".

At the same time, others have contended that resistance to surveillance will depend less on policy mechanisms devised and implemented by elites, and more on the extent to which opposition to surveillance practices can be mobilized through social movement organizations. For some activists, the progress of the issue depends on the building of a more coherent activist network, which not only uses available means of redress, but continuously

exposes overly intrusive practices and „outs" the organizations that are responsible for them (Davies 1999). The building of an anti-surveillance movement might be a difficult proposition, but it is essential if the steady drift towards the „surveillance society" and the consequent erosion of personal privacy are to be prevented.

To the extent that a „politics of surveillance" has emerged, it has tended to be framed in terms of the language of „privacy" and the myriad strategies of a disparate network of „privacy advocates." This paper investigates the meaning of these terms and surveys the variety of privacy advocacy groups that have emerged from civil society in different countries. There is a large number and enormous range of organizations which would identify with this cause. In light of the number of claimants to the word „privacy", the landscape needs some overview and differentiation, on both individual and organizational levels.

The network of civil society actors described here is, of course, part of a larger policy community engaged with the development and implementation of policy on privacy and data protection. There is a complex and dynamic regime of participants which include regulatory bodies, data controllers, data subjects, technology developers and providers, government policy-makers, the media, and, of course, privacy advocacy groups (Bennett and Raab 2006, 220). There are a lot of people with a stake in these issues. The effectiveness of the system of privacy protection, both nationally and internationally, depends on the attitudes and behavior of all of these participants, all engaged in what we have called the „governance of privacy".

Whilst, the attitudes and behaviors of civil society groups have tended to be marginalized within a largely elitist community and discourse, I contend that collective resistance is more common than is often realized and that it is manifested through a transnational advocacy network that is becoming increasingly significant and effective, despite a lack of resources. We have witnessed a number of high-profile campaigns against the capture of personal information on the Internet – against Microsoft, Google, Intel, Facebook and others. There have been very visible protests and boycotts against some companies for the use of Radio Frequency Identification Devices (RFIDs) in their products. A proposal in Japan for a centralized national identity system (Juki Net) was met with street protests and government embarrassment. In the UK, the Blair government's proposals for a national identity card became one of the most controversial and partisan issues of modern British politics (Bennett and Lyon eds. 2008). In Germany, there has been activism against new laws mandating the retention of communications data by Internet Service Providers (ISPs). There is at least anecdotal evidence that new schemes for personal information processing can provoke more intense and widespread resistance than occurred in the 1970s and 1980s.

Based on a comparative project on privacy advocates and advocacy (Bennett 2008), this paper paints a picture of the privacy advocate network, and suggests a useful typology of both organizations and actors. Despite multiple dilemmas concerning the framing of the problem(s) in terms of „privacy", I contend that it matters deeply whether the issue is framed in terms of a civil liberty, a human right, a digital right, a consumer problem or in terms of a series of „single issues". These dilemmas are manifested in a deeper tension between the individualistic foundations of the right to privacy, and the collective prerequisites and grievances that tend to be at the root of social movement politics. Nevertheless, while privacy may never mobilize a coherent social movement, as the epigraphs at the beginning suggest, it has certainly galvanized an important transnational activist network that is typical within contemporary networked societies (Keck and Sikkink 1998).

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2   What is a Privacy Advocate?

The term „privacy advocate" has emerged as shorthand to describe anybody who might challenge the processing of personal information by government or business. Privacy advocates are those who are called upon to comment, critique, and offer the opposing perspectives when government and business propose controversial schemes for the processing of personal information. Every day, they are quoted in the media in criticism of a huge range of privacy intrusions.

A diverse number of individuals self-identify as privacy advocates. The issue is broad and amorphous and so is the community that identifies with it. Privacy advocates are found in government, in business and in civil society. Indeed, there is a plausible argument that everybody is, or should be, a privacy advocate. Because personal information is collected, stored, processed and disseminated about each and every one of us, we all have a subjective interest in ensuring that the right information is handled by the right people for the right purposes. And at some point, we may all declare that our information should not be provided to this or that organization on the grounds that it is „none of their business". Hence, „privacy" in the abstract is a cause that few people would wish to oppose. There is no self-declared opposition movement to the right for citizens to have control over their private space and their private information. There is no „anti-privacy" movement, as there is an „anti-abortion" movement.

These observations do not, however, get us very far. At the same time that indiscriminate and widespread use of the term „privacy" appears in the media, there is also a sense that a privacy advocacy community exists as a relatively distinct network from those who are mandated to advance the cause, either in their capacity as privacy and data protection commissioners, or as the chief privacy officers (CPOs) in corporations. There is a distinction between those who are paid to promote privacy protection within their societies and organizations, and those who emerge from civil society. Governments and business sometimes also „reach out" to the privacy advocacy community by drawing them into consultative and advisory exercises. There is, therefore, a growing sense that the privacy advocacy network has a relatively distinct profile and identity, despite the fact that anybody can self-identify as a privacy advocate.

Advocates do what they do to promote a cause, a principle or a norm. They advocate changes in policy and practice because they believe it is right, not because it is linked to a rationalist understanding of their interests. Furthermore, the term „advocate" not only implies a normative commitment to a set of principles or values, but also a desire and ability to speak on the behalf of others, precisely because few of us have the time and energy to be our own „advocates". That meaning is also implied in terms like „animal rights advocates" or „child protection advocates". Societies arguably need a set of informed and interested individuals to act as the „gatekeepers" between a concerned but poorly informed citizenry and the governments and corporations that process our information.

In the privacy advocacy network there are a number of different types of gatekeepers. For example, some self-identify more as „activists" than advocates. Advocates „advocate" whereas activists agitate, mobilize or resist. Privacy activists tend to take more radical or principled positions. They do not balance privacy against competing public interests, because they know that the opposing arguments will always be made with force by people with far more resources than they. For the activist, the privacy argument requires an un-

compromising articulation rather than a negotiation with competing social interests. The „balancer" is a „pragmatic advocate" (or „pragvocate"), according to Simon Davies of Privacy International.[5]

Activism for some also entails the education of the general public, such that they are more sensitive to the dangers of certain technologies, more aware of their rights and more likely to put pressure on elected representatives. It is an activism rooted in the belief that real change can only come from below, by changing the conditions that give rise to the perceived threats in the first place. Activism implies a transformation of ideas and beliefs, over and above a reform of laws, policies and institutions. Thus „grassroots activism" is often contrasted with governmental „advocacy".[6]

Whether the motivation to activism is in terms of behavior, principle, or concentration on the grassroots, there are probably a good number of individuals in a number of countries who would self-identify as such. At the same time, there would be many who would not, because of the association of activism with more radical forms of resistance and protest. In a policy community dominated by legal and technical experts, an activist's politics can sit uneasily. It is common, therefore, for the privacy activists to be marginalized as extremists, and to have their messages denigrated. To this end, terms like „privacy nuts"[7] or „privacy extremists"[8] have entered the rhetoric. Likewise, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, some considered opposition to national ID systems as tantamount to „giving comfort to terrorists".[9]

Most privacy advocates need to play at least one other role in order to make a living. Privacy advocacy finds expression through traditional grassroots activism, through scholarly research and teaching, through consultancy, through hardware and software development, through journalism and through various forms of artistic expression. There are few pure stereotypical cases. Most self-identified privacy advocates wear a number of hats, and juggle several responsibilities. Roles are self-assigned, but they are also imposed in multiple and conflicting ways by others.

Some advocates, for example, adopt the view that first and foremost privacy issues need to be researched so that the dangers can be exposed. Privacy issues require a great deal of research – on the technical issues, the legal requirements, public attitudes, the costs of implementation, the philosophical underpinnings and so on. The problems are not self-defining; they need to be analyzed and rendered transparent. This category does include a wide variety of types of research and researcher: tenured and untenured faculty with regular positions at Universities; those in less permanent positions at universities employed and funded through centers or projects; graduate students; as well as researchers in non-governmental organizations. Some would self-identify as regular participants within the privacy advocacy network whereas others come and go. Yet others perform their scholarship for other reasons, and it then gets utilized by privacy advocates without any express efforts on the part of the researcher.

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5 A term coined by Davies at the first Computer, Freedom, Privacy (CFP) conference in 1991. See the report on Risks Digest at: http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/11.39.html

6 A group called „Privacy Activism" was created for this very reason. http://www.privacyactivism.org

7 David Coursey, „Privacy Nuts, Chill out", *Forbes Magazine*, April 22nd, 2005; „How a broadband provider got slimed by privacy nuts," ZDNET, February 15, 2002 at: http://review.zdnet.com/4520-6033_16-4206955.html

8 „FBI Calls Privacy Extremists Elitist", Techwire, September 25, 1997.

9 Lyle Hawkins, „Opposition to National ID: Giving Comfort to Terrorists", *Edmonton Journal,* November 8, 2001.

When the privacy issue first arose to public and political attention, academic scholars had a very important impact on the development of privacy protection policy in their respective societies, and explicitly self-identified as privacy advocates. Indeed, one of the main explanations for the spread of data protection law in Europe in the 1970s was the influence of a fairly small group of, primarily, legal scholars and experts (Bennett 1992). Academics have continued to play a very significant role within the privacy policy community. At one level, scholarly work provides the intellectual foundation for privacy advocacy by explaining and justifying the problems and challenges in larger historical, sociological, political and philosophical terms. Many scholars also teach courses on these subjects and thus attempt to influence new generations. Many also engage in other activities, such as giving testimony, being expert witnesses, lodging complaints, initiating litigation, commenting on government bills and documents, writing reports, appearing in the media and so on.

There is a number of overlapping scholarly traditions. There is a legal tradition which continues to be very influential for privacy advocacy, and has accompanied the spread of data protection law in Europe and beyond (Schwartz and Reidenberg 1996; Swire and Litan 1998; Bygrave 2002; Solove 2004, 2008). There is also a very important sociological tradition on the creeping and routine nature of surveillance, which constitutes a new and profound condition of modern societies. New surveillance practices also sort, categorize and therefore discriminate, in positive and negative ways (Gandy 1993; Lyon 2001, 2003a, 2003b; Marx 1988; Rule 2007). Another related tradition comes from the discipline of political science on the assumption that privacy is, at root, about power. As a policy issue that has risen to the agendas of advanced industrial states at roughly the same time, privacy offers interesting insights into the ways that different states have defined the problem of privacy invasion, applied a range of policy instruments and, in recent years, tried to balance the value against a more dominant security agenda (Bennett 1992; Bennett and Raab 2006; Regan 1995; Gilliom 2001; Whitaker 1999). Privacy protection also raises profound philosophical issues about the appropriate definitions of privacy and the ethical justifications for invasion – by the state and by other individuals. Philosophical writing has drawn spatial, behavioral and informational distinctions and has suggested ways in which scholars and policy-makers might better frame the question given different contexts (Schoeman 1992; Nissenbaum 2004).

Work in the „physical sciences" tends to have less direct applicability to privacy advocacy. The work of cryptographers such as Ron Rivest and Whitfield Diffie are obvious exceptions (Diffie and Landau 2007). Research on computer and information security, from people such as Bruce Schneier, also finds direct and immediate resonance within the privacy advocacy community (Schneier 2003). A further academic research tradition centers on questions of anonymization. Latanya Sweeney runs the Data Privacy Lab at Carnegie Mellon University and has made numerous discoveries related to the re-identification of individuals from so called de-identified data. For Sweeney, there is a „science of privacy" and ways to construct „privacy technology" in such a way that personal information may only be accessed for legitimate purposes. Her pioneering work has received recognition among privacy advocates and regulators in many countries.[10]

Hence, privacy experts have gradually embraced this notion that technologies can also be part of the solution, as well as part of the problem. With the revolutionary discovery of

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10 See examples of the work of the Data Privacy Lab at http://privacy.cs.cmu.edu/index.html

„public-key" or „asymmetric" cryptography in the late 1970s, privacy, or perhaps more accurately, anonymity can be built into information systems in ways that do not compromise the ability of public and private organizations to authenticate transactions (Chaum 1992). A new concept – privacy-enhancing technologies – entered the vocabulary and began to complement other legal and self-regulatory measures (Bennett and Raab 2006, ch. 7).

This vision, together with challenges to the notion of anonymous communications and interactions from law enforcement interests, consolidated the community of mainly young technologists and turned them into privacy advocates. This community interacted through some of the earliest online networks. Perhaps the spirit of this community was best expressed by John Gilmore, one of the original programmers at Sun Microsystems at the first of the annual series of very influential Computers, Freedom and Privacy (CFP) conferences: „I want to guarantee – with physics and mathematics, not with laws – things like real privacy of personal communications […] real privacy of personal records […] real freedom of trade […] real financial privacy […] and real control of identification" (quoted in Levy 2001, 208).

Many other less well known and less controversial figures were part of this community, developing various privacy-enhancing tools throughout the 1990s. These included developers of anonymizing and pseudonymizing devices, tools for cookie and spyware filtering, instruments for the management of spam and so on. For a while, privacy advocacy witnessed a relatively coherent movement, fuelled by a genuine excitement about the potential of the Internet to foster private communications and transactions. This community embraced a range of different characters, motivated by the belief that they could solve a problem which law and regulation had not solved, and by the vision that they were engaging in a crucial effort to shape this new medium *de novo*. However, the early enthusiasm about the privacy-enhancing potential of cryptographic tools gave way at the end of the decade to a certain realism about the developing nature of the Internet and a scepticism about the extent to which ordinary consumers were actually interested in anonymous transactions. Most efforts to develop profit-making ventures from privacy-enhancing technologies failed, as encryption products were integrated into an increasingly monetized Internet.

The „boundary" between research and advocacy is certainly crossed when advocates, including academics, take on clients. The term „consultant" is used in as many different ways as is the term advocate. Essentially, it means being paid for services but, beyond that, there are a number of different consulting roles that privacy advocates can, and do, play. Privacy protection is becoming a complex subject. Organizations find themselves having to comply with new privacy rules. They develop new systems and services with privacy implications, which demand privacy impact assessments. They receive pressure from their consumers. Occasionally they get media exposure. Many organizations therefore need expertise – sometimes in a temporary capacity, and sometimes more continuously. A new profession has emerged – the „privacy consultant" – with a new professional association, the International Association of Privacy Professionals.[11]

Some privacy advocates find it difficult to resist the temptation to take money for advice, research, training or education, and through those processes continue to advocate the privacy cause. Others observe a slippery slope, believing that one can never be a privacy advocate and, at the same time, take money from data users. Some advocates will not take

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11 Homepage at: https://www.privacyassociation.org

any money from corporations for any reason. Others draw the line between general support and consulting for a fee or service. How far can the advocacy/consultant go in advancing a more fundamental privacy argument? It is clear that there are constraints. Many contracts will include a confidentiality agreement which will prevent the consultant from outside comment. At the very least, and for most people, the consultancy role will tend to dull the edge of their criticism, and certainly make them more reluctant to speak in the media. The ability to perform as a consultant is contingent: on the ability to choose clients who genuinely want to change their practices and on the capacity of the consultant to walk away if they do not.

A few other advocates have tried to carve out careers specifically as „privacy journalists" through the regular publication of newsletters about developments in the field. The prominent examples in the United States are *Privacy Journal* and *Privacy Times*. In countries where there are more comprehensive and established private sector privacy laws, the privacy publications tend to report less on the current conflicts of the day, and more on legislative and policy developments, decisions by data protection agencies and courts as well as self-regulatory initiatives. Examples include the online newsletter *PrivacyScan* in Canada, *Privacy Law and Policy Reporter* in Australia as well as *Privacy Laws and Business* centered in the UK.

The fact is often overlooked that an anti-surveillance politics can be expressed through many art forms. „Advocate/artists" rarely participate in more conventional group politics, infrequently engage with government and business elites on these issues and almost never turn up to conferences. For some, it may be a stretch to include such artists within the broad privacy advocacy community. By directing the public's attention to the capacities and dangers of new surveillance, however, they play a vital role. Art can set the conditions under which individuals might come to understand surveillance practices and the shifting boundaries between public and private space, and technology and the human body.[12]

It is also obvious that there are no easy generalizations about what makes a privacy advocate. They are: men and women, black and white, gay and straight, young and old, rich and poor, and so on. Some are active church goers; most are not. Most have higher levels of education, though their educational backgrounds are extremely diverse: humanities, sciences, medicine, business, social sciences, law, librarianship, computer science and others. Some have personal experience of intrusions; others do not. They also come from every wing of the ideological spectrum. It is probably the case that most advocates share a somewhat center-left, civil libertarian political perspective. Others, however, would be positioned on the radical left, and would find sympathies with an anti-capitalist or anti-globalization agenda (Webb 2007). Some spring from a libertarian philosophy of minimal governmental intervention (Harper 2006). Others find favor with those on the Christian right (Albrecht and McIntyre 2006). Privacy advocacy has no conventional ideology – it can be promoted and opposed by those from all political and partisan positions.

All, however, are drawn by a fundamental belief that privacy is not only an important issue, but one of the defining questions of modern times. All would share a profound sense that new technologies should be shaped to human ends, rather than vice versa. All have deep-seated worries about abuses of power by modern organizations using the latest technological tools. Since the 1990s, all would be animated by the excitement of being at the

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12 See, for instance, the „Rhetorics of Surveillance" exhibits at: http://ctrlspace.zkm.de/e/

cutting edge of a fundamental transformation in human communications. Privacy had become central to the debates about the character of the Internet, and privacy advocates have assumed a central role in a rapidly evolving story about the development of this revolutionary medium.

3   Privacy Advocacy Organizations

An analysis of the individual privacy advocates exposes one dimension of the network. The groups or organizations within which they operate tell another story. The pattern of group formation tends to reflect the issue itself – constantly changing, very diverse and almost infinitely flexible. A definitive „mapping" of the landscape is impossible. Only an incomplete list is presented in the Appendix.[13]

The first point is that the modern policy issue, defined as privacy in the US and data protection in Europe, has sustained few advocacy groups whose sole interests are in these issues. There are exceptions, such as Privacy International, the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) or the Australian Privacy Foundation. But in most countries, the privacy advocacy role is inextricably linked to broader civil liberties, human rights, consumer or Internet freedom questions. Most groups have arisen, therefore, for reasons beyond those of advocating for privacy rights. It matters profoundly, therefore, how the issue is perceived and articulated through some broader framework or discourse.

Some groups, for instance, see the issue as a civil liberty. Civil liberties are, however, traditionally thought of in terms of governmental, rather than corporate, power. For these groups, therefore, privacy advocacy tends to be focused on the protection of individuals from intrusions by the instruments of the state and (most especially) by law enforcement agencies. The political cultures of many countries do not readily embrace a „civil liberties tradition" which tends to be associated with countries which have written constitutions including enumerated rights. However defined, in most advanced industrial societies we find civil society groups which have long sought to protect individuals from abuses of power by the state. Privacy advocacy, while often not described as such, is a significant component of that tradition.

Many would insist that privacy is fundamentally a human right, and claim that it is far broader than one among many civil liberties. The claims of civil liberties advocates tend to be made with reference to specific national constitutional guarantees, such as the Bill of Rights in the United States. Claims about privacy as a „human right" tend to be made in more universalistic terms and derived from certain inherent human rights by virtue of our humanity, rather than our citizenship. Thus the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that „everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person" (Article 3). It goes on (Article 12) to state that „no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."

There is evidence that many groups in democratizing countries see the close relationship between surveillance and other forms of repression and have embraced a pro-privacy

13 See also: http://privacyadvocates.ca

agenda – even they do not term it as such. Privacy issues are often brought to the fore as a result of the practical and inherent problems of campaigning for human rights in repressive regimes. Human rights organizations, such as Amnesty International, face some agonizing dilemmas about the collection and confidentiality of extraordinarily sensitive information about rights abuses, dissidents, and so on. Their workers are, themselves, subjected to surveillance, the interception of communications and sometimes more brutal treatment. Some groups have arisen to assist these groups in protecting the privacy and security of their communications.[14]

National and international consumer protection groups have a long involvement with privacy issues.[15] They have assisted individuals with complaints about consumer credit, direct-marketing, and identity theft as well as with the various consumer services on the Internet. These protection groups have lobbied for better privacy and data protection laws. They have researched and written reports on new and emerging consumer issues. For them, the illegitimate capture, collection, use and disclosure of personal information are all issues of deceptive trading. These groups associate good privacy protection with good business practices, and many of them have no difficulty also being privacy advocates.

Virtually every group mentioned so far has been involved in Internet privacy questions. Some, however, would not have emerged *but for* the Internet and the desire to create an open medium based on sound democratic principles. That there are a separate set of „digital rights" which are an extension of more fundamental civil rights and liberties is controversial. The belief, however, frames the work of a number of national and international organizations, of which the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) is probably the most important.

A final category embraces a sprawling number of single-issue groups which have decided for various reasons to concentrate their efforts on a particular technology or practice, on a type of information, on a set of vulnerable people (such as children) or on a particular business sector (such as consumer credit). A notable example is the Surveillance Camera Players who have been performing skits before the video-surveillance cameras in New York City for around ten years, and who have motivated similar groups in other cities and countries (New York Surveillance Camera Players 2006).

It is probably the case that most privacy advocacy groups have sprung from the American political culture. Certainly those that are the best funded are American. This seems to support the thesis that the more pluralistic atmosphere for group formation in the United States, in tandem with the relatively open and fragmented political system, is conducive to the proliferation of many voluntary associations. Legislative processes at state and federal levels tend to be based on open hearings at which outside groups are invited to testify. Where legislatures fail, the courts may also be avenues for redress and policy change. Any US privacy advocate would testify to the uphill battle and the powerful state and corporate forces weighed against them. Nevertheless, the political culture does provide multiple opportunities for voices to be heard and encourages a culture of group formation. But it is also instructive how quickly the groups in the US have proliferated. Within the space of a few years, the American landscape shifted from one in which the principal activity was centered from within the American Civil Liberties Union to one where, by the mid-

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14 Privaterra is a notable example: http://www.privaterra.org
15 The National Consumer Council in the UK and the Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband (Federation of German Consumer Organizations) are examples.

1990s, there was a multiple set of actors jostling for a position with the American privacy space.[16]

It is not clear that the word „group" adequately captures all the advocacy behavior documented in this article. Some are indeed voluntary associations in the classic mold – non-profit groups registered under their respective statutes with membership lists and subscription dues. Many, however, have no membership base, though they might operate with boards of advisors. Some can have grandiose titles which describe nothing more than a website and perhaps a bulletin board, blog or listserve. There is deceptiveness in names because even when these groups atrophy they still tend to maintain a well-publicized web presence.[17] The Internet provides many false fronts, behind which are the same cast of characters.

4   The Privacy Advocacy Network

Traditional concepts do not adequately capture the dynamic, volatile, overlapping, fragmented and somewhat illusive nature of privacy advocacy. There is certainly no clear structure. Neither is there a social movement with an identifiable base. Perhaps the closest is that of the „advocacy network" which can be conceptualized as a series of concentric circles. Those at the center possess a set of core beliefs about the importance of privacy, and as one passes to the outer edges, the issue becomes more and more peripheral. Policy change occurs, according to some hypotheses, when those on the periphery begin to share the core beliefs of those at the center (Sabatier 1988).

With respect to privacy protection, the advocacy network might look something like the following. At the center are a number of *privacy-centric* groups such as EPIC, Privacy International, the Australian Privacy Foundation, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, and Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering (CASPIAN). Other issues are peripheral, and if addressed, have to be entirely consistent with a pro-privacy (anti-surveillance) message. As we move out of the center of the circle we encounter a number of *privacy-explicit* groups for whom privacy protection is one prominent goal among several. Many of the civil liberties and digital rights organizations, such as ACLU, EFF, Center for Democracy and Technology and Statewatch, fall into this category. In these organizations, privacy has to compete within the group's agenda for attention and resources.

Within the outer circle, there are an almost indefinite number of *privacy-marginal* groups, for whom privacy is a peripheral goal. Rarely do you find the word privacy on their websites or in publicity materials. Their goals are defined in very different terms – preventing torture, defending the rights of women, gays and lesbians, the homeless, children, librarians, ethnic minorities, journalists and so on. Despite not explicitly focusing on privacy issues, the protection of personal information and the restriction of government surveillance can be central to these groups' purposes and instrumental in promoting their chief aims. There is therefore a vast range of groups for whom privacy is a marginal purpose, and for whom it might become a central goal with the right motivation.

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16 The most prominent examples are the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the Center for Democracy and Technology, the Electronic Frontier Foundation, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, and CASPIAN.
17 Take for instance the Global Internet Liberty Campaign: http://www.gilc.org

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Beyond the outer edge of the third circle are, therefore, a huge number of *potential groups* whose support could be mobilized given the right issue, or the correct case of intrusive governmental or corporate behavior. Privacy is an implicit or potential goal for these groups.

The contemporary privacy advocacy scene is best described as a transnational advocacy network (Keck and Sikkink 1998). This network is characterized by three features. It is *segmentary*: „composed of many diverse groups which grow and die, divide and fuse, proliferate and contract". It is *polycentric*: „having multiple, often temporary, and sometimes competing leaders or centers of influence". And it is *networked*: „forming a loose, reticulate, integrated network with multiple linkages through travelers, overlapping membership, joint activities, common reading matter, and shared ideals and opponents" (Gerlach 2001).

The privacy advocacy network is composed of multiple groups and individuals with varying commitment to the central value of privacy. It is non-hierarchical in the sense that no one group is considered more important than any other. There is no one person who can claim to speak for the network as a whole, any more than there is one group that is representative of the entire movement. It is an open network and has no defined limit. It expands and contracts depending on the issue and the opponent. This fluidity integrates with the network's culture of improvisation, where priorities are never established in any coherent way and instead emerge because one or two actors decide to do something, and ask around for support.

5 The Privacy Advocacy Network and Social Movement Politics

The privacy advocacy network has never been regarded as a „social movement" either by those within it, or by those observing from the outside. Indeed, neither has any group activity associated with the communications and information revolution, whether it is broadcasting, telecommunications regulation, freedom of information, or intellectual property (Mueller, Page, and Kuerbis 2004). These issues tend to be seen as within the more specialized and technocratic realms of politics and policy-making. For the most part they do not excite passions and popular adherence.

But what is meant by a social movement? Scholars have tended to expand the definition in response to the kind of activism they have seen around them. The dominant school of sociological thought on social movements in the mid 20th century tended to focus on collective behavior, associating movements with phenomena such as riots, crowds and mass hysteria. They had their inception in conditions of dissatisfaction and unrest (Blumer 1939, 199) or relative deprivation (Gurr 1970). More complex and varied concepts and approaches were, however, necessary as a result of the „new social movements" that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s with their greater emphasis on non-materialistic values and lifestyles, and a tendency to emerge more from middle than working class constituencies (Inglehart 1977). Many new social movement theorists also emphasized a change from the industrial, heavy manufacturing based „Fordist" economy to a „post-industrial", „postmodern" or „post-Fordist" economy centered more on the service sector. For Touraine (1981), for example, the passage to a post-industrial society, the conflicts and cleavages have been defined less by struggles between labor and capital, and more in terms of „ways of life".

Social movements can also develop special patterns of expression and connection which distinguish them from the wider culture. The uniqueness of a social movement's culture is therefore determined by the shared values, styles, behaviors, languages, traditions, symbols, and/or other forms of group definition. But much of a movement's culture may be unspoken, invisible, such as a sense of connection based on shared past experiences (Lofland 1995). For some social movements, the essential role is an enabling one for the participants who seek to understand themselves and their relations with others. Social movements should permit self-actualization, an understanding of what it means to be a black in the United States, a woman, a gay man, a lesbian or a first-nations member. Thus, they not only seek to change laws and policies and focus on articulating and aggregating demands from the state or replacing political elites, but to also attempt to change social conditions and attitudes. These movements try to establish new meanings about the nature of the political and a new „political space" (Magnusson 1996).

Tarrow provides several more precise criteria for social movement development. He insists that social movements should have a common purpose which help define an „us and a them". People join movements to mount „common claims against opponents, authorities or elites". They should exhibit „solidarity and collective identity", not in a temporary or ephemeral manner but in a sustained way over time. There is a need to „sustain contentious politics" for it is only by „sustaining collective action against antagonists that a contentious episode becomes a social movement" (Tarrow 1998, 6). It is the sustenance of collective action that marks the social movement from isolated acts of resistance.

Other scholars have theorized a natural life cycle to social movement politics, or an organizational ecology which contends that groups do rise and fall according to predictable patterns. Growth takes place in the early stages as the organizational form is legitimated. It then declines as the competition for resources intensifies. The early stages of informality and loose relationships give way over time to higher levels of institutionalization. In some interpretations, this process might lead to a level of bureaucratic organization that loses contact with constituent groups and sight of its original purpose (Alberoni 1984). However, it is very much an open question in an era of social networking and Internet activism whether the patterns of movement institutionalization that were observed in earlier eras hold true today. A recent study of the organizational ecology of groups within the area of communications and information (including privacy groups), asks the explicit question whether a broad conception of communications and information policy can provide the basis for sustained social movement activism. Quantitative data indicate that the „answer is almost certainly 'no' if one looks backward, but very possibly 'yes' if one looks forward and extrapolates current trends" (Mueller, Page, and Kuerbis, 2004, 182). These authors also see that the rise of Internet activism is overcoming prior problems of movement segmentation.

Today's conception of a social movement is therefore very inclusive. It embraces those based on ascriptive identities – the women's movement, the civil rights movement, the gay and lesbian movement – as well as those surrounding particular issues – the environmental movement, the anti-nuclear movement, the labor movement, the anti-globalization movement. Furthermore, the arguments of some social movement theorists would seem to predict the development of movements around the issues of surveillance and privacy. The issue and the politics arose through two conditions of post-industrial society – information technology and complex organizations. It emerged at exactly the same time as

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other „post-materialistic" questions – environmentalism, feminism, gay and lesbian rights, civil rights and so on. Like those issues, challenges to surveillance are deeply rooted in wider challenges to state power (Fuentes and Frank 1989). There appear to be many similarities between the properties of this issue, and those of other „post-materialistic" questions that have produced more coherent, visible, and international social movements from highly heterogeneous constituencies.

Perhaps, then, this can be a social movement. If we can talk in terms of a movement surrounding such vague concepts as „anti-globalization" then surely an „anti-surveillance" politics can be embraced by the term. Nevertheless there is still a puzzle. There has been an enormous amount of policy activity surrounding privacy: law, codes of practice, international agreements, privacy-enhancing technologies and a sprawling network of institutions all involved in the governance of privacy (Bennett and Raab 2006). Despite the magnitude of this increased policy activity, little of it has occurred as a result of concerted grassroots pressure. Few would contend that the greater salience of the issue is attributable to the rise of a broader „pro-privacy" or „anti-surveillance" politics. It is still generally an elitist issue, within government, business and civil society.

So could an anti-surveillance movement develop, given time, as Marc Rotenberg of EPIC suggests at the outset of this paper? Or, is there something inherent in the issue that precludes privacy and/or surveillance from rising to a higher level of mass consciousness and political mobilization?

6 The Properties of Privacy

There is a strong current of opinion in the privacy advocacy network that this issue is „different". However framed, some contend that it entails some peculiar properties which are never going to promote a broader political activism. No doubt this issue *is* different, but different from what, and should the differences make a difference? A number of arguments have circulated around the network.

The first proposition is that „privacy" can never foster any sense of collective identity. Some movements are also held together by ideology, or a common framework of understanding about the respective roles of state, civil society and market, and the relations between them. But privacy goes to the heart of those very questions, and the network has embraced groups and individuals with fundamentally different ideological understandings. It embraces those with a deep suspicion of the role of the state, as well as those who would insist that law and regulation are a prerequisite for sustained privacy protection. It embraces those who believe in, and perhaps revere, the free market, to those who accept the freedom of the market but insist on its regulation, to those who embrace an anti-capitalist and anti-globalization agenda. The ideological underpinnings of the network's composite members are as diffuse as politics itself.

Neither can one identify the glue as a sense of shared grievance, which is generally the focal point around which movements are organized and evolve. It is generally true that those people whose privacy is more endangered are those from more marginalized communities. They tend to receive higher levels of surveillance, particularly from the state. After 9/11, for instance, there has been increasing levels of grievance among Arab-Americans,

and an increasing level of concern about discriminatory surveillance practices.[18] However, the relationship between measures of social stratification and levels of surveillance is full of contradictions. Some surveillance practices, such as some forms of direct marketing, are explicitly targeted at those with higher levels of income. There are a range of tricky theoretical and empirical questions about the distribution of privacy protection within any society (Bennett and Raab 2006, ch. 3).

A second and related argument concerns the highly subjective nature of privacy. Context determines the level of risk. Public policy, in terms of laws and codes, is thus generally framed in procedural terms permitting individuals to exercise their privacy rights if they so wish, and against the practices they, as individuals, find most intrusive. The highly contextual and subjective nature of the issue makes it hard to measure levels of risk, and difficult to produce collective action. It is difficult to deny that there are constraints imposed by the variable, subjective and contextual nature of the issue.

A third contention is that privacy always has to be balanced against a countervailing public interest which is typically more powerful. With few exceptions, there is always a justification for the capture and processing of personal information. National security arguments are invoked to justify the interception of communications. Safety is invoked to defend video-surveillance. Equity is invoked to justify the collection of personal information for government services. The efficient conduct of marketing – „making sure the right people get targeted with the right ads" – is invoked to justify the collection and profiling of consumer data. The speedy and efficient access to websites is invoked to justify the logging of cookies on personal hard drives. The protection from fraud is invoked to justify the entire consumer credit industry. A desire for a productive and safe workplace is invoked to justify schemes for workplace monitoring such as keystroke monitoring or active badges. Even other advocacy campaigns can be invoked on occasion – the environmentalism movement, for example, has proponents for the remote monitoring of home energy consumption and the surveillance of vehicles as part of congestion charging schemes.

Privacy advocates have certainly had to struggle with a discourse that is often framed in terms of false dichotomies. They have also had to resist the very metaphor about „balancing", insisting that privacy protection is not incompatible with collective interests like security, efficiency, consumer satisfaction and so on. Nevertheless, there is nothing inherent in this problem which is not also manifested within other areas. Environmentalism, for example, faces arguments about the need to reconcile conservation against powerful arguments concerning the protection of productive capacity in economic sectors, be it logging, fishing, automobile manufacture, or the use of open space for governmental projects. Just because there is a battle over language and interest between advocates and powerful interests should not render broader political activism impossible.

A fourth argument, which also tends to be advanced in comparison with environmentalism, concerns the visibility of harm. Whereas it is possible to observe and measure the direct results of some environmental pollution, arguments against excessive levels of surveillance often have to be pitched in terms of abstract rights and fears of hypothetical consequences. To be sure, many horror stories about the inappropriate collection and use of

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18 In August 2004, for instance, the Arab American Institute coordinated a campaign against the provision of tabulations on the Arab-American population, prepared by the Census Bureau to the Department of Homeland Security and to the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection. See statements, correspondence and media coverage at http://www.aaiusa.org/issues/civil-liberties/dhs

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personal information can be marshaled to the cause (Smith 1993). However, as Phil Agre puts it: „With environmental pollution you can at least see the smoke and oily seabirds, but with invasions of privacy the information flows silently, out of sight, and then you can't figure out how they got your name, much less which opportunities never knocked because of the bad information in your file."[19]

It is true that much of the harm from privacy invasions is latent. Most individuals will therefore see the intrusive direct-marketing call, the denial of a loan, the refusal of insurance, the subjection to extra security screening at the airport, or the inaccurate tax return and not perceive these problems as „privacy problems". Despite their perception/rationalization of these inconveniences, each problem might have been directly, or indirectly, caused by the collection and processing of inaccurate, obsolete or incomplete personal data. The cause and effect are often hidden and circuitous. That is not to say, however, that other social movements are free of similar dilemmas. The contemporary argument about global warming is exactly about making a link in the public mind between the burning of fossil fuels and the melting of the polar ice caps, and interpreting complex science in ways that can change attitudes and behavior. And there are increasingly direct and visible manifestations of surveillance technology – video-surveillance, identity cards, biometric scanning – which provide a direct moment of personal information capture. The increasingly frequent instances of data breaches can also be regarded as the privacy equivalent of the dumping of toxic waste. Indeed, the use of the term „data spills" deliberately invites this comparison.

Privacy is perhaps one of those issues which *is* a mile wide and an inch thick. In its diffuseness, it cannot attract deep and abiding commitments. It is always an issue, but never the top issue. It is at the heart of civil rights, civil liberties, health care policy, law enforcement, national security, employment law, and so on, but it is never sufficiently prominent to garner in-depth commitment in and of itself.

7 Conclusion: Storming the Barricades for Privacy

The essential tension, therefore, is about how to „frame" the issue in ways that define a sense of collective grievance following from excessive surveillance. Can that sense of shared grievance grow when the issue is invariably articulated through the conceptual lens of „privacy"? There is a fundamental dilemma in trying to energize collective action around an emotive and powerful concept that is derived from a very subjective and individualistic right. The term has been remarkably resilient. It attaches to a huge array of policy questions, to a sprawling policy community, to a transnational advocacy network, to an academic literature and to a host of polemical and journalistic commentary. Despite the fact that nobody can supply a precise and commonly accepted definition, the term maintains an enormous and global appeal, in the English-speaking world and beyond.

This appeal persists in the face of a steady body of academic criticism. For many scholars, this unstable and protean term has never been remotely adequate to capture the complex and multifaceted implications of organizational processing of personal information. Some contend that privacy connotes individualism, and concentrates on the subjective

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19 Phil Agre, Department of Information Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, http://polaris.gseis.ucla.edu/pagre/notes/99-12-26.html

interests rather than the collective good; privacy is about the „me" rather than the „us". It is also arguably plagued with the same problems associated with a „rights discourse" more generally (Haggerty and Erickson 2006, 9). Others contend that the framing in terms of privacy cannot embrace the discriminatory impacts of information processing (Gandy 1993), or the larger role that surveillance plays in „social sorting" (Lyon 2003a). Privacy is not, therefore, the „antidote to surveillance" (Stalder 2002).

In recognition of the inherent problems with the concept, other scholars have tried to realign the privacy term in more collective or social terms. Priscilla Regan, most notably, has made a compelling argument for thinking about privacy as a collective good, because „privacy's importance does not stop with the individual" (Regan 1995, 220). In a similar vein, Andrew Clement has contended that there is a conceptual and discursive equivalence between the environmental commons and the information commons, between the ecosphere and the „infosphere" (Clement and Hurrell 2005). Clement (2006, 47) contends that the different strands of this movement are gradually being interwoven into this infosphere: „by framing the infosphere as an embodied ecological environment, information rights movements can more easily articulate a set of rights and responsibilities for the citizens who operate within it, and can work together to develop and protect an information environment that is widely accessible and responsive to the needs and aspirations of computer users".

These arguments would suggest that advocacy should be more persuasive when individual cases are projected to societal trends and common experience than when it remains blithely focused on individual cases and particular experiences. Some groups have framed their struggles in terms of opposition to excessive „surveillance", a term that is similarly fraught with conceptual confusion. The ACLU depicts a „Surveillance Clock" on its website. Privacy International published in June 2007 an assessment of the privacy practices of the major Internet companies, ranking them according to ten variables of privacy friendliness and providing a color-coded score on a scale from „privacy-friendly and privacy-enhancing" to „comprehensive surveillance and entrenched hostility to privacy". The results achieved some media attention and stiff responses from Google, the only company given the lowest, and blackest, mark.[20]

Despite these constraints, my research has suggested that the privacy advocacy network is increasing in visibility and significance (Bennett 2008). Interactions within the network are becoming more regular and frequent. There is now a broader recognition that a diverse set of interests can be attracted to particular causes, and thus make the network appear wider and more politically significant than in the past. Slow adjustment to the realities of the issue, and to the potential of the Internet, has produced a widespread realization that such broad-based campaigns are beneficial for the network and the issue. As this realization develops and spreads across the network of privacy advocates, these individuals might become more cohesive and institutionalized over time, and result in less pragmatic and fewer ad hoc methods for setting priorities and engaging in campaigns. Any such realization will undoubtedly grow as more horizontal connections are made between privacy advocates internationally. There is, therefore, growing evidence of collective action, and indeed isolated incidents of „storming the barricades so that we can all be private together".

I would also contend that the network has had some success in thwarting the more intrusive and ambitious surveillance schemes of government and the private sector. Advo-

20 See Privacy International, „A Race to the Bottom: Privacy Ranking of Internet Service Companies, A Consultation Report", June 9, 2007, http://www.privacyinternational.org/article.shtml?cmd[347]=x-347-553961

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cates are learning how to combine their cause with wider political and/or corporate interests. They are learning how better to marshal information to the debates, link the issues to symbolic events that resonate within the political culture, apply leverage where possible, and in particular force organizations to live up to their own rules, and those of the jurisdictions in which they operate. There are many legal and non-legal rules about privacy protection and some are strong, and others weak. This said, *any* public statement or commitment to privacy protection, however weak and qualified, provides an opportunity to test whether words are supported by actions and practices (Bennett 2008).

These descriptions of the privacy advocacy network, whilst admittedly an incomplete snapshot, are strikingly consistent with conclusions about transnational advocacy from other studies of other international political issues. Kekk and Sikkink's case studies, for example, contend that the very notion of the network as a structure infuses much of what individual actors do and say: „However much an individual or representative of a particular organization may speak and act in the name of a network without necessarily consulting its other members regularly, the synergy of networking nonetheless transforms the timbre of his or her voice. The 'voice' of the network is not the sum of the network component voices, but the product of an interaction of voices" (Kekk and Sikkink 1998, 207). Thus, the agents are consulted not as individuals, but as „privacy advocates". Whether or not these actors have formerly consulted the network matters little. Power imbalances within the network matter little. The existence of the network, and the relations between the network participants, gives the agents a voice, and often allows them to „punch beyond their weight".

In spite of the potential for privacy advocates to coalesce they may never become a social movement – not because of anything inherent in privacy protection, but because the advocacy network is becoming the dominant mode of organization in international relations. Perhaps a mass-based social movement will not develop, precisely because there is a transnational advocacy network. Hence the standard has changed, and the comparisons against 1960s social movements are perhaps misplaced. The network society has changed the meaning of what a social movement is, and affected the standards of evaluation (Castells 1996). How can the presently operating privacy network become like „environmentalism" or „civil rights" or „feminism" is not the question to ask. If the privacy advocacy network does not transform into a social movement, with significant mass mobilization, then perhaps it does not matter.

What is clear is that the development, and modest success, of this network has proceeded despite the significant dilemmas in framing the issue in terms that are equal to the size and complexity of the challenge. Perhaps, therefore, the importance of an appropriate issue frame is exaggerated. Conceptual and philosophical contradictions seem to have been overwhelmed by a term which still carries much emotive power and popular appeal. For all its faults, *privacy* is the concept around which this network has coalesced, and will probably evolve. For better or worse, „privacy advocates" have learned to live with it.

Appendix: List of Privacy Advocacy Organizations

Organization	Abbreviation	Country
Alfa-Redi		Peru
American Civil Liberties Union	ACLU	United States
Amnesty International	AI	International

Arbeitskreis Vorratsdatenspeicherung (Working Group on Data Retention)		Germany
Arge Daten		Austria
Association Electronique Libre (Electronic Freedom Association)	AEL	Belgium
Association for Technology and Internet	APTI	Romania
Australian Privacy Foundation	APF	Australia
Bits of Freedom	BoF	Netherlands
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association	BCCLA	Canada
Buro Jansen and Janssen		Netherlands
Californians Against Telephone Solicitations	CATS	United States
Campaign for Digital Rights	CDR	United Kingdom
Canadian Civil Liberties Association	CCLA	Canada
Canadian Internet Public Policy Clinic	CIPPIC	Canada
CATO Institute	CATO	United States
Center for Digital Democracy	CDD	United States
Centre for Democracy and Technology	CDT	United States
Chaos Computer Club	CCC	Germany
Coalition against Unsolicited Commercial E-mails	CAUCE	United States
Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility	CPSR	United States (chapters in Canada, Spain, Peru, Africa, Japan)
Consumer Action	CA	United States
Consumer Association		United Kingdom
Consumers Against Supermarket Privacy Invasion and Numbering	CASPIAN	United States
Cyber Rights and Cyber Liberties		United Kingdom
Derechos Digitales (Digital Rights)		Chile
Deutsche Vereinigung für Datenschutz (German Association for Data Protection)	DVD	Germany
Die Humanistische Union (The Humanist Union)	HU	Germany
Digital Rights Denmark		Denmark
Digital Rights Ireland		Ireland
Electronic Frontier Finland	EFFI	Finland
Electronic Frontier Foundation	EFF	United States
Electronic Privacy Information Center	EPIC	United States
European Civil Liberties Network	ECLN	Europe
Foebud		Germany
Förderverein Informationstechnik und Gesellschaft (Association for Information Technology and Society)	FITUG	Germany
Forum Informatikerinnen für Frieden und gesellschaftliche Verantwortung (Forum of Computer professionals for Peace and Social Responsibility)	FIFF	Germany
Foundation for Information Policy Research	FIPR	United Kingdom

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Frontline
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Global Internet I
Health Privacy
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International Civ
Internet Society
Iuridicum Reme
Junkbusters
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Liberty Coalition
Medical Privacy
Motorists Again:
National Associa
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National Consum
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Netjus
Netzwerk Neue I
New York Surve
NO2ID
Patient Privacy F
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Privacy Rights C
Privacy Ukraine
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Privacy Journal
Privacy Mongoli
Privacy Times
Private Citizen I
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Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer Rights	FTCR	United States
Frontline		Canada
Fundacion via Libre (Open Source Foundation)		Argentina
Global Internet Liberty Campaign	GILC	International
Health Privacy	HP	United States
ID Theft Resource Center	ITRC	United States
Imaginons un Réseau Internet Solidaire	IRIS	France
International Civil Liberties Monitoring Group	ICLMG	Canada
Internet Society		Bulgaria
Iuridicum Remedium		Czech Republic
Junkbusters		United States
La Ligue des Droits et Libertés (League of Rights and Liberties)		Quebec, Canada
Leave Those Kids Alone	LTKA	United Kingdom
Liberty Coalition		United States
Medical Privacy Coalition	MPC	United States
Motorists Against Detection	MAD	United Kingdom
National Association of State Public Interest Research Groups	US-PIRG	United States
National Consumers League	NCL	United States
National Council for Civil Liberties/Liberty	NCCL	United Kingdom
Netjus		Italy
Netzwerk Neue Medien (Network New Media)	NNM	Germany
New York Surveillance Camera Players	SCP	United States
NO2ID		United Kingdom
Patient Privacy Rights Coalition		United States
Privacy International	PI	United Kingdom
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse	PRC	United States
Privacy Ukraine		Ukraine
Privacy Activism		United States
Privacy Journal		United States
Privacy Mongolia		Mongolia
Privacy Times		United States
Private Citizen Inc.		United States
Privaterra		Canada
Public Interest Advocacy Centre	PIAC	Canada
Public Interest Computing Association	PICA	United States
Quintessenz		Austria
Seguridad en Democracia (Security in Democracy)	SEDEM	Guatemala
Statewatch		Europe
Stichting Waakzaamheid Persoonsregistratie (Privacy Alert)	SWP	Netherlands
Swiss Internet User Group	SIUG	Switzerland

Transatlantic Consumer Dialogue	TCD	Europe
UK National Consumer Council	NCC	United Kingdom
Utilities Commission Action Network	UCAN	United States
Verbraucherzentrale Bundesverband (Federation of German Consumer Organizations)	VBV	Germany
Verein für Internet-Benutzer Österreichs (Association for Austrian Internet Users)	Vibe AT!	Austria
World Privacy Forum	WPF	United States

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Autor

Johann
nes-Gu

Colin
der Uni

Ulrich

Oliver
tät Leip

Tobias
Leipzig

Leon
schaftli
Univers

Gerrit
taltung

Stefan
Albert-

Susann
forschu

Reinhar
in Wien

Aldo Le

Gary T.
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